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This paper employs a relatively new method of competition measurement, the Boone indicator, in 10 
vibrant microfinance markets: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Indonesia, Philippines, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Mexico and Peru. This approach is able to measure competition on a yearly basis in market 
segments without considering the entire market as other well-known methods, for instance, the 
Panzar-Rosse model, requires. Stochastic frontier (SF) models have been employed to estimate the 
translog cost function (TCF) and then marginal costs are computed. Potential endogeneity of 
performance and costs are overcome by utilizing a two-step GMM estimator. Results show that 
competition levels vary from country to country and over the period 2003-2010 India and Nicaragua 
had the most competitive microfinance loan markets. Competition among the microfinance 
institutions in Bangladesh and Bolivia declined significantly over time, which may be due to the 
partial reconstitution of market power by the giant MFIs in these countries. Competition in other 
countries remained mostly unchanged over the years, in line with the consolidation and revitalisation 
of respective microfinance markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance has recently experienced rapid and unprecedented growth in many developing 
countries. Both the numbers of microfinance service providers and clients served have greatly been 
increased (Assefa et al. 2013). Huge investment flows into microfinance operations from 
profitmaking sources and increased patronization and subsidized funding from governments and 
development agencies are the key drivers of such growth. Consequently, microfinance institutions1 
(MFIs) are now less dependent on grants, charitable money, donations, concessional funding and 
subsidies (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2011). This has induced commercialisation of microfinance 
operations leading to increased competition amongst the MFIs for markets and to some extent to the 
saturation of microfinance services. But providing retail financial services among the low-income 
clients is still a vast potential market (CGAP, 2005), which increasingly attracts the profit-oriented 
commercial banks to enter the market (Assefa et al., 2013). This helps competition to increase further. 
However, since MFIs normally operate in places which are little penetrated by commercial banks, 
competition in microfinance is particularly increased with MFIs’ growing commercialization of 
operations (Cull et al., 2009b) if not through direct penetration of commercial banks.  
 
Interests in studying competitive conditions in microfinance markets are scant. So, literature on the 
consequences of competition in microfinance is not very rich. Also the results of a small number of 
studies conducted before remained ambiguous. For instance, Motta (2004) argued that increased 
competition generally contribute to reducing production costs, lowering prices of goods and services 
and also to developing new products and efficient technologies. Assefa et al. (2013) claimed that 
MFIs are to expect similar benefits of competition. However, increased competition in microfinance 
by and large did not bring much positive impacts per se. For example, McIntosh and Wydick (2005) 
claimed that competition may lower the borrower selection standards, weaken bank-customer 
relationships and enhance multiple borrowing and loan defaults. Schicks and Rosenberg (2011) 
supports this view by arguing that MFIs’ outreach and loan portfolio performance in general have 
declined due to competition and clients are now more prone to over-indebtedness and falling into the 
situation of debt-trap. Again, apart from these ambiguities, there is little empirical evidence currently 
available to estimate the influence of growing competition on the price and quality of loan products 
and on the financial soundness of micro-lenders. Also, we know very little on the yearly growth of 
competition in different markets. Therefore, it is crucial to explore the degrees, causes and 
consequences of competitiveness, or the likely presence of anti-competitive behaviour and 
inefficiency, in different microfinance markets as they might impose severe costs on respective 
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markets later. For instance, higher competition may deepen the concerns for mission drift in 
microfinance since too much market power negatively affects clients’ access to financial services2.  
 
It is difficult to measure competition applying any direct approach as data on costs and prices of 
banking products are usually unavailable (Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). So, many indirect measures of 
competition have been in use in the banking literature. In microfinance literature, a recent study of 
Assefa et al. (2013) has used the Lerner index to measure competition. Baquero et al. (2012) 
constructs the yearly Herfindahl–Hirschman indices in attempt to capture the changing competitive 
environment in microfinance. Mersland and Strom (2012) measured competition by employing the 
Panzar-Rosse revenue tests in static and dynamic versions. But, these measurers have their own 
limitations and may not appropriately measure competitiveness especially in loan markets where 
interest rate regulations are in place3 (Xu et al., 2013). Microfinance operations are increasingly 
regulated these days. So, quite reasonably we need to employ a relatively better approach for studying 
competitive conditions in microfinance markets.  
 
The ‘profit elasticity’ (PE), or the Boone, indicator is a relatively improved measure of competition. 
Founded on the ‘relative profit differences’ (RPD) concept, and essentially as an elaboration on the 
efficiency hypothesis, the PE indicator is based on the idea that competition rewards efficiency 
(Boone, 2008). The underlying intuition is that in a more competitive market, firms are punished 
more harshly (in terms of profits) for being inefficient. The PE indicator has several advantages. First, 
it measures competition not only for the entire country’s microfinance market, but also for the 
concerned MFIs’ product markets (e.g., loan market). Second, unlike the Bresnahan (1982) model 
the approach is less data-intensive. Third, differences in MFI legal types (e.g., non-profit NGO, non-
bank financial institution, village bank etc.) should not matter while estimating this indicator. Fourth, 
the approach allows for the estimation of yearly competition measures to assess developments over 
time, while ignores differences in product quality, design and the attractiveness of innovations 
(Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). All in all, the PE indicator is more robust from theoretical as well as 
empirical point of views. It is in this context this paper uses the PE indicator as a relatively new and 
better measure of competition. Applying this measure for the banking sector Schaeck and Cihák 
(2010), Boone and Leuvensteijn (2010) and Leuvensteijn et al. (2011), for instance, provide a more 
explicit empirical validation.  
 
However, despite the above advantages and the recent interests in studying the impacts of competition 
in microfinance, no study so far has employed the Boone indicator to explore the competitive 
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conditions in different microfinance markets. By introducing this indicator to microfinance data this 
paper contributes to the empirical literature on microfinance competition. Numerous MFIs used to 
function as monopolists before they were commercialized (CGAP, 2001; McIntosh et al., 2005) with 
potential allocative and technical inefficiencies leading to welfare losses. But MFIs now generally 
follow similar business practices, grant small loans to unbanked poor customers and small business 
enterprises and normally the repayment period is less than a year. Against a backdrop of recent 
changes in the microfinance competitiveness, now MFIs are on average monopolistically competitive 
so changes in lending rates, total revenue and profitability are the results of increased input prices 
(Mersland and Strom, 2012). All of these traits are appropriate for applying the Boone indicator for 
measuring competition in the market.  
 
The paper will contribute to the literature in many ways. First, the analysis will provide an empirical 
investigation of the differing levels of competition in selected microfinance markets. Second, to 
contribute methodologically, estimates of the degree of competitiveness have been obtained through 
panel data estimations, by which we can take care of the dynamic and reforming microfinance market 
landscapes under scrutiny and their varying regulatory environments. Thus, the short-run dynamics 
in the data can be handled and the inference problems linked with non-stationary data are solved. In 
terms of originality, the study will contribute to the microfinance, banking and industrial organization 
literature at least in three ways. First, this is one of the first attempts to use the Boone indicator in 
microfinance data. We extend the definition of competition and move beyond common measures of 
competition for example the Lerner’s index, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) as used in other studies. Second, the global dataset used in this study has 
observations on a large number of MFIs over a longer period. Third, results of this exercise can be 
used in other studies on competition and industrial organisation. Results show that India and 
Nicaragua had the most competitive microfinance loan markets over the period 2003-2010. 
Competition among the MFIs in Bangladesh and Bolivia declined significantly over this time period, 
which may be due to the partial reconstitution of market power by the giant MFIs in these countries. 
Competition in other countries remained mostly unchanged over the years, in line with the 
consolidation and revitalisation of respective microfinance markets.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of literature on different 
approaches to measure competition in microfinance. Section 3 explains the Boone indicator model as 
a new measure of competition. The data are described in section 4. The econometric method and the 
results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
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2. Measuring competition in microfinance  
As noted earlier, at least two recent developments over the last few years have induced increased 
competition in microfinance. First, both the number of microfinance clientele and the number of MFIs 
have increased very rapidly because of subsidized funding and supportive activities of governments 
and development agencies and diversification of funding sources including welcoming funding from 
commercial sources. The popularity of the self-sustainability model of microfinance operation has 
also driven MFIs to shift their focus on funding from the commercial sources. Second, the number of 
for-profit commercially-oriented MFIs has increased alongside. To function properly, MFIs largely 
depend on soft-information and useful client-institution links. These mainly help solving the 
information asymmetry problems pervasively active in the context of credit allocation. However, 
increased competition among the MFIs led by these recent developments have affected MFIs’ 
activities in a variety of ways and hindered them functioning properly as described below.  
 
The socially-oriented MFIs and their clients are particularly affected by increased competition. A 
higher level of competition in general exacerbates moral hazard and information asymmetry in the 
industry. Setting-up a theoretical model, McIntosh and Wydick (2005) argue that competition reduces 
the ability of MFIs to cross-subsidize and increases asymmetric information on borrower quality. As 
a result, impatient borrowers become keen to acquire multiple loans, over-indebtedness increases and 
repayment rates decrease. Increased competition also induces the profitable and productive clients of 
the socially-motivated MFIs to shift to the profit-oriented MFIs. Such transfer eventually worsens the 
loan-portfolio quality of the socially-motivated MFIs and negatively impacts their cross-
subsidisation4 possibilities (Navajas et al., 2003; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005; Vogelgesang, 2003). 
Schicks and Rosenberg (2011) found similar results. They claim that, through its impacts on the 
clients, increased competition in microfinance creates information asymmetry in the industry coupled 
with repayment problems of the borrowers leading to the risk of over-indebtedness, debt-traps and 
increased sociological and psychological constraints. McIntosh, Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) argue 
that repayment performance of borrowers may worsen and the amount of savings deposited with the 
village bank may reduce as a result of increased competition. However, Baquero et al. (2012) finds 
that for-profit MFIs charge significantly lower loan rates and demonstrate better portfolio quality in 
less concentrated markets. But nonprofit MFIs are comparatively insensitive to changes in 
concentration. In saturated markets, MFIs try to maintain their customer base and decrease their costs 
by lowering lending standards or decreasing screening efforts (Schicks and Rosenberg, 2011) thus 
leading to higher loan defaults due to the increase of risky borrowers. Regarding outreach 
performance, Assefa, Hermes and Meesters (2012) argue that intense competition is negatively 
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associated with MFI performance measured by outreach, profitability, efficiency and loan repayment 
rates. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) and Lensink and Meesters (2008) also confirm that increased 
competition has a negative impact on outreach. To summarize, increased competition in microfinance 
thus affects the MFIs and their clients in at least two ways. First, increased competition leads to a 
decline in the borrower quality as better performing clients move to profit-oriented MFIs. 
Consequently, loan defaults rise. Second, with increased competition the interest rates drop, resulting 
in lower profitability and less cross-subsidisation. 
 
Due to data unavailability, however, it is generally difficult to apply direct methods to estimate the 
degree of competitiveness of a market (Leuvensteijn et al. 2011). So, there are clear differences in 
terms of techniques applied and several indirect methods have been used for measuring competition 
in banking and microfinance markets. The stream of literature on this topic can be divided into two 
major approaches: the structural (or, industrial organization—IO) approach and the non-structural 
(or, new empirical industrial organization—NEIO) approach. The structural method, originated from 
the industrial organisation theory, proposes tests of market structure to assess competition on the basis 
of the ‘structure conduct performance’ (SCP) paradigm. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater 
concentration causes less competitive conducts and leads to greater profitability. This hypothesis 
assumes that market structure affects competitive behaviour and, hence, performance. Also, 
especially in the banking literature, many articles test this model jointly with an alternative 
explanation of performance, namely the efficiency hypothesis, which attributes differences in 
performance (or profit) to differences in efficiency (e.g. Goldberg and Rai, 1996). The SCP method 
uses concentration indices such as the n-firm concentration ratios or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) as proxies for market power. In microfinance literature, among others, Baquero et al. (2012) 
employed the HHI to measure competition in microfinance markets covering data from 379 MFIs 
located in 69 countries over the period 2002-08. To measure competition, Olivares-Polanco (2005) 
used data from 28 Latin American MFIs and employed the percentage of concentration of the largest 
MFIs by country, where concentration denotes the market share held by the largest MFIs in a country. 
 
Nevertheless, the structural approach has several deficiencies (Hannan, 1991). Although the SCP 
paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis have frequently been employed in empirical research, they 
lack proper support from the microeconomic theory (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Delis et al., 2008; Coccorese, 2009). As a result, the non-structural (or, the NEIO) approaches 
are increasingly being used in recent times which, from the estimated parameters of equations, draw 
inferences on the observed behaviour (Lau, 1982; Bresnahan, 1982; Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Carbo 
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et al., 2009). While the structural measures infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such 
as market structure or market shares, non-structural methods measure the conduct directly. Within 
this framework, requiring detailed data though, the simultaneous-equation approach calculates 
competition by simultaneously estimating supply and demand functions. Among others, the Panzar-
Rosse revenue tests (PR-RT) (Panzar and Rosse, 1987)—which provides an aggregate measure of 
competition—requires easily available data on MFI-specific variables only. The PR-RT checks 
whether the input and output prices move in harmony or they move disproportionately (Xu et al., 
2013). But, the Lerner index—an individual measure of market power—views that high profit may 
indicate a lack of competition. In that sense market power is related to profitability. Thus the Lerner 
index uses the ‘price cost margin’ (PCM), i.e., the mark-up in output prices (P) above marginal cost 
(MC) (Xu et al., 2013). In other words, market power equals (P–MC)/P. The PCM is usually taken 
as an indicator of market power because the larger the margin, the larger the difference between price 
and marginal cost. In their recent study, Assefa et al. (2013) applies a Lerner index to measure 
competition in microfinance and the study is based on data from 362 MFIs in 73 countries for the 
period 1995–2008. Mersland and Strom (2012) apply the Panzar-Rosse model to microfinance data 
from 405 MFIs in 73 countries covering 1998-2010. 
 
Among other measures of competition used in the microfinance literature, Vogelgesang (2003) uses 
the fraction of clients of the bank with concurrent loans from other MFIs. In McIntosh et al. (2005), 
competition is measured in terms of the number, presence and proximity of competitors providing 
group loans at the lending group level. Using data from 342 MFIs located in 38 countries, Cull et al. 
(2009a) measures competitive pressure by using bank penetration variables such as the number of 
bank branches per capita and per square kilometre. This is, however, a country-level measure of 
competition. Thus we see that although previous studies have used different competition indicators 
such as the Lerner index, the PR H-statistics, the HHI etc., no study has employed the less-data-
intensive Boone indicator for measuring competitiveness of microfinance markets.    
 
3. Measuring competition: The Boone indicator model 
The Boone (2008) model5 considers the impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profits and 
market shares centring on the idea that more efficient firms (firms with lower marginal costs) gain 
higher market shares or profits. The higher the degree of competition in the market the stronger the 
impact and the more negative the indicator. Quite intuitively, competition improves the performance 
of efficient firms and weakens the performance of inefficient firms. The Boone model has at least 
two advantages. First, products are assumed close substitutes with no or low entry costs which is an 
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advantage over the concentration measures and some other competition proxies. Second, the Boone 
indicator measures competition for specific product markets and different categories of financial 
institutions. Following Schaeck and Cihak (2010) and Leuvensteijn et al. (2013), the following model 
defines the Boone indicator as follows: 
 
ln πit = α + ∑ βt 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝐶it)𝑇𝑡=1  + ∑ αtdt
𝑇−1
𝑡=1  + μit     (1) 
 
where πit stands for profit of MFI i at year t, MC is the marginal costs of MFI i at year t, β denotes 
the Boone indicator and dt is the time dummy. The above specification evaluates the competitive 
conditions for each microfinance market included in the dataset for the entire period. We add the time 
dummies to control for timely evolution of the profits within a country. We expect that MFIs with 
low marginal costs gain higher profits, i.e. β < 0. Competition tends to increase this effect, since more 
efficient MFIs outperform less efficient ones. The more negative β is, the higher is the competition 
level in a market. However, positive values for β means that the more marginal costs a bank has the 
more profits it will earn (Leuvensteijin et al., 2011) signifying the presence of extreme level of 
collusion or competition on quality (Tabak et al., 2012). 
 
The Boone model also provides the yearly estimates of competition to let us examine the evolution 
of competition every year. So, we introduce one time-dependent interaction variable of the Boone 
Indicator and the time dummies. We estimate the yearly Boone scores from the following equation 
where the individual time dummies are to capture the year-specific factors common to all MFIs in the 
market: 
ln πit = α0 + ∑ βtdt 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝐶it)𝑇𝑡=1  + ∑ αtdt
𝑇−1
𝑡=1  + μit  (2) 
 
Where, explanations for all the variables and coefficients are similar to equation (1).  We use ROA 
(return on assets) as a proxy for profits6 and following Leuvensteijn et al (2011), marginal costs (MCit) 
for each MFI and year in the database have been estimated from a separate translog cost function 
(TCF) as marginal costs are not observed directly7. We then use the MC as an explanatory variable 
both in (1) and (2). In the translog cost function we include one output and three variables for input 
costs: cost of labour, cost of funds and cost of capital. Gross loan portfolio is used as a proxy for 
output. Costs of three inputs have been proxied respectively by the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets, the ratio of financial expenses to total assets and the ratio of administrative expenses to 
total assets. We impose symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions in input prices. Linear 
homogeneity means that costs will increase (decrease) by the same proportion as the costs of inputs 
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increase (decrease). Hence, intuitively, the total costs represent the three inputs included in the cost 
function. Thus, we define the TCF as follows: 
 




2 + ∑ αjlnWjit3j=1  + lnqi ∑ αjlnWjit
3




∑ αjklnWjitlnWkit3j, k=1  + ∑ αtdt
𝑇−1
𝑡=1  + εit  (3) 
 
where TCit stands for total costs (captured by the total expenditures over assets ratio) of MFI i at year 
t, qit represents output of MFI i at year t captured by the gross loan portfolio, W denotes the three 
input prices and εit is an error term. Time dummies (dt) for each year are also included to capture the 
technological progress over time.  
 
Previous studies (see, for example, Leuvensteijn et al., 2011) have employed the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to estimate the parameters of the cost function. However, employing OLS may have 
several limitations including producing biased parameter estimates resulting from the 
multicollinearity problem since the TCF includes a large number of explanatory variables. Recently, 
stochastic frontier (SF) models have become a popular tool for efficiency analysis. Theoretical 
motivation of the SF model is that no economic agent can exceed the ideal “frontier" and the 
deviations from this extreme represent the individual inefficiencies. The parametric SF models 
characterize a regression model (estimated by likelihood-based methods) with a composite error term 
that includes the classical idiosyncratic disturbance and a one-sided disturbance which represents 
inefficiency (Belotti et al., 2012). Thus, as an alternative, this paper uses a parametric SF model to 
estimate the translog cost function. We use the specification of the TCF in logarithmic form as it 
allows interpreting the first-order coefficients as cost elasticities.  
 








(𝛿0 +  δ1lnqit + ∑ δj+1lnWj,it3j=1 )   (4) 
 
Leuvensteijin et al. (2011) and Schaeck and Cihak (2010) suggest potential endogeneity problems in 
the estimation of equations (1) and (2) as performance and costs are determined simultaneously8. So, 
based on the endogeneity tests we either utilize a two-step GMM estimator, where we use first lag of 
MCit as the instruments, or we choose to use a fixed-effects model (i.e., the within estimator) to 
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estimate the models. The marginal costs are computed by substituting parameter estimates from TCF 
into equation (4). 
 
4. Data 
MFI-level financial, portfolio and outreach performance data were obtained from individual MFI 
profiles voluntarily reported to the MIX Market database, the most detailed publically available 
database so far. Initially, data were collected for the period 1996 to 2010 from 1144 MFIs operating 
in 35 countries (in total, 7146 observations). These MFIs are of all legal types—non-profit NGOs, 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), banks, rural banks, cooperatives/credit unions and others. 
However, not all of them could be utilized in the exercise. The selection criteria for MFIs were mostly 
based on the available amount and quality of the data. After careful verification of the data and 
excluding MFIs and/or periods with missing, negative or zero values for variables of our interest, 
resulting sample for estimating the Boone indicator is an unbalanced panel of 521 MFIs of 10 
countries. The countries are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Indonesia, Philippines, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru. As required, ten separate panel datasets have been created 
corresponding to the microfinance sectors in each of these countries. In the datasets, MFIs report 
information for 3-8 years. The MIX Market uses ‘diamonds’ to rank the MFI-data quality on a scale 
of 1 to 5, where 5-diamonds imply the best quality. To ensure high quality data, in the datasets we 
mostly kept MFIs with at least a level-3 (3-diamonds) disclosure rating on the MIX market. However, 
to avoid any potential bias in sample selection we also included 28 observations on MFIs which have 
less than level-3 disclosure rating9. Besides, as two time lags have been used in several estimations, 
the database finally reduces 3001 observations from 2003 to 2008. The sampled MFIs have been 
distributed among all six developing regions in the world—East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (EECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)10.   
 
These countries have been selected for a number of reasons. First, the study attempts to cover regional 
differences in the level of competition. So, the sampled countries come from three different 
developing regions with vibrant presence of microfinance operations: South Asia, East Asia and the 
Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. These countries have potential differences in their 
regulatory frameworks too. Also, the revenue streams of MFIs in these regions vary from country to 
country depending on their product portfolio mix. For example, Indonesian MFIs largely generate 
revenues from micro-savings. Whereas, in India MFIs mostly rely on microloans for their revenue 
generation. So, seemingly these two microfinance industries have different types of revenue streams 
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and they are difficult to compare. But as we are employing the Boone indicator to measure 
competition, differences in country-specific revenue sources do not matter much. Thus we can 
compare the revenue stream of a ‘micro-saving’ centric country (Indonesia), for instance, with that 
of a ‘microloan’ centric country (India). Second, in this study countries where the microfinance 
sectors are getting increasingly competitive and characterized by differing levels of concentration 
have been chosen. Third, these countries are of varying magnitudes of population, GDP and footprint 
of the microfinance sectors. For example, India is one of the biggest countries in the world, with a 
population of around 1.27 billion in 2013, as well as a country boasting several big MFIs in the world. 
On the contrary, for instance, Ecuador and Peru are much smaller than India having population of 
only 15.4 million and 30.4 million respectively.  
 
Table 1 provides the descriptions of the variables used in the analysis. Table 2 and Table 3 present 
number of observations by country, MFI legal types and year. Table 4 presents the summary statistics 
of the MFI-level output and input price variables used in the translog cost specification by countries. 
Evidently, MFIs from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru generally have the largest loan 
portfolios. In contrast, the smallest micro-financing systems in terms of loans are those from 
Indonesia, Nepal and Philippines. 
 
5. Estimation Results of the Boone Indicator 
5.1. Degree of competition in microfinance across countries 
This section discusses the full sample period estimates of the Boone indicator. In Table 5, as evident 
from the summary statistics of the Boone scores, our data include MFIs that are practically highly 
competitive (negative Boone-score) and those that are collusive (positive values for the Boone 
indicator). Table 5 presents averages of the Boone indicator over 2003–2010 by country. The results 
suggest that competition in the sampled microfinance markets varies considerably. We observe that 
the microfinance loan market in Bangladesh is the most competitive. Also, the loan markets in India 
and Nicaragua were among the best competitive markets within the sampling period. However, as we 
can see from the minimum and maximum values, competition levels have changed significantly over 
time in all sampled countries other than in Peru and Indonesia. Again, the microfinance loan markets 
of Indonesia, Philippines, Peru and Nepal were generally less competitive. To explain these dissimilar 
levels of competition we now turn to the yearly estimations of the Boone indicator as presented in 
Table 6. 
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Note that, the Boone indicator is now time dependent. While the above conclusions based on the full 
sample period estimates generally remain valid, there are some notable differences across countries 
in the Boone indicator’s development over the years. Across countries, not all the yearly Boone 
indicators differ significantly from zero. As expected, the value of βt is in some cases positive (instead 
of being always negative) in all of the sampled countries. Table 6 shows that the betas do not differ 
significantly from zero in several cases and this is true for all the years and all the countries in the 
sample. For Bangladesh, India, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Mexico, we observe considerable jumps in 
the series over time (see also Figure 1 and Figure 2). However, the estimated successive annual betas 
for each country do not differ significantly from each other. Other than Bangladesh and Nepal, all 
other countries in the sample show positive βt values for varying number of years instead of the 
expected negative values which is consistent with the rationale provided for eq. (2) before. 
 
Estimates suggest that currently (in year 2010) the microfinance sectors in India and Nicaragua are 
among the most competitive ones. In the beginning of the sampling period the microfinance industries 
in these countries were not very competitive, but over the years they have become so. Most likely, 
this result for India and Nicaragua hinges in part on the special structure of their microfinance 
regulatory system. For example, a large number of Indian MFIs is of non-bank financial institution 
(NBFI) status and they are equally regulated and competing with almost equal footing. Thus, the 
competitive environment of these NBFIs operating countrywide has possibly been reflected in the 
Boone indicators for the Indian MFIs.  
 
5.2. Developments in competition over the years 
Recently the microfinance sector in Bangladesh went through a process of regulation which is likely 
to have had a catalytic effect on competition, as our estimates suggest strong competition in 2003. In 
more recent years, however, the giant Bangladeshi MFIs may have been able to reconstitute some 
market power as our results point to a continuous decline in competition since 2003. A similar 
declining trend in competition is also seen in the Bolivian microfinance market (see Figure 2).  
 
Our estimates of the Boone indicator for the Indian and Nicaraguan microfinance markets show a 
significantly increasing trend over the years under scrutiny. This gradual increase in competition may 
be due to the decrease in market share of the giant MFIs in respective countries. In India, competition 
among the microfinance service providers seems to have improved significantly (see Figure 1). This 
remarkable increase can be partly attributed to a history of no or very little competition in 2003. In 
particular, our estimates show that the Indian microfinance sector experienced a rather marked 
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transformation from a climate with very little competition in 2003 to a more competitive environment 
in recent years. This partly reflects the process of financial deregulation and the gradual resolution of 
the bad loan problems that plagued the industry recently. Also, profound and structural changes in 
the Indian microfinance industry have helped to foster a competitive environment. An increasing 
trend in competition is also seen in the Nicaraguan microfinance sector. Again, as Figure 3 shows, 
the degree of competitiveness in the microfinance sectors in other sampled countries remained mostly 
the same over the years (2003-2010). One plausible explanation for this outcome is that the regulatory 
environment did not change much to affect the overall competition scenarios in these countries.   
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper uses a new measure for competition, the Boone indicator, and is the first study that applies 
this approach to the microfinance markets. This indicator quantifies the impact of marginal costs on 
performance, measured in terms of return on assets. Instead of approximating marginal costs by 
average variable costs, this paper calculates the marginal costs from the estimated translog cost 
function by employing the stochastic frontier approach (SFA). Finally, these marginal cost estimates 
have been used to compute the Boone indicators. Although the approach is not beyond limitations, 
especially since MFIs are still subsidy-dependent in many cases and their products are not necessarily 
always similar, this approach has the advantage of being able to provide the yearly observations 
microfinance in a market segment. Other well-known measures of competition, e.g., the PR-RT, 
consider only the entire market. Moreover, estimation method of the Boone indicator is less data 
intensive.  
 
The study employs the Boone indicator to 10 vibrant microfinance markets. Results show that during 
the period under scrutiny the degree of competitiveness of the sampled microfinance markets vary 
significantly. Overall, the microfinance markets in India and Nicaragua were among the best 
competitive. Competition among the MFIs in Bangladesh and Bolivia declined significantly over 
time, which may be due to the partial reconstitution of market power by the giant MFIs in these 
countries. Competition in other countries remained mostly unchanged over the years, in line with the 
consolidation and revitalisation of respective microfinance industries. 
 
All in all, as the estimated Boone indicators show, competitive conditions in the microfinance markets 
and their developments over time differ considerably across countries. These differences seem largely 
to reflect the distinct characteristics of respective microfinance sectors, such as the relative 
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Notes 
1. However, some studies (e.g., D’Espallier et al., 2013) claim that despite increased 
commercialisation of microfinance, subsidies still play an important role in MFIs’ operations and 
around 95% of them depends on subsidised funding to cover costs and finance loans.  
2. The concerns for mission drift in microfinance are at the heart of recent debates on the future of 
microfinance. Discussions on this, however, are beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed and 
focused discussion on this issue, see for example, Mersland and Strom (2010), Kar (2013), 
Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) and Armendariz et al. (2011).  
3. See, for example, Xu et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion on why conventional indicators such as 
the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in loan markets properly 
due to the system of interest rate regulation. 
4. Cross-subsidisation means reaching out to the wealthier clients to finance a larger number of poor 
clients having smaller average loan size. 
5. Discussions in this section as well as part of the literature reviews used in this paper follow the 
discussions in Kar and Bali Swain (2014). Tabak et al. (2012), for example, presents a literature 
review on the studies that employ this method. In addition, Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) provide a 
detailed discussion on this measure and on competition in the financial sector. 
6. The dependent variable is computed as log (1+ROAit) just to avoid negative values of return on 
assets in the log specification.    
7. Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses, and interest expenses. 
8. Schaeck and Cihak (2010) approximate a firm's marginal costs by the ratio of average variable 
costs to total income. 
9. This study sampled MFIs which have: 5-diamonds (20.96%), 4-diamonds (42.09%), 3-diamonds 
(36.02%) less than 3-diamonds (0.93%). 
10. These regional classifications are according to the World Bank. 
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Table 1: Description and definition of variables 
Variable name    Description            
Total costs    Total expenditures over total assets ratio (normalised by one of the input prices: price of labour) 
     
Boone indicator A proxy for competition; The absolute value of the βt in equation (2). 
 
Output Proxied by gross loan portfolio  
 
Unit price of labour Ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. Personnel expenses include wages and salaries, social security 
contributions, contributions to pension funds, and other staff-related expenses. 
      
Unit price of funds  Ratio of interest expenses to total intermediated funds (current accounts, savings accounts, time deposits, 
repurchase agreements, as well as alternative funding sources such as retail bonds). 
 
Unit price of physical capital Ratio of administrative expenses to total assets. Administrative expenses include rents, service charges, 
security, information systems and communications, other office and insurance expenses, professional 
charges, publicity and advertising, and depreciation. 
Notes: Variable price of labour (proxied by personnel expenses to total assets) is used to normalise the total expenditure, output (proxied by gross 
loan portfolio) and three input price variables used in the analysis. All of these variables were first adjusted by their respective median values. 















Page 18 of 27 
 
Table 2: Number of observations by country and year  
Country/Year  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010        Total 
Bangladesh  43          53          54          36          32          29          28          27         302  
Bolivia  11          18          20          25          24          23          23          23         167  
Ecuador  24          19          35          43          46          47          43          40                297  
India   31          67          73          79         68          80          78          71                547  
Indonesia  21          23          25          40          40          31          18          16         214  
Mexico  5           8           26          33          45          41          39          39         236  
Nepal   15          22          26          33          33          32          28          27         216  
Nicaragua  19          24          25          24          25          26          25          23         191  
Peru   31          42          45          50          58          60          58          57         401  
Philippines  36          55          60          61          61          61          57          39         430  
Total   236         331         389         424         432         430         397         362            3001 
 
 
Table 3: Number of observations by country and MFI legal types 
Country name    Legal type 
      NGO  NBFI  Bank  RB  CU-Coop Others  Observations 
Bangladesh    289  0  8  0  5  0  302  
Bolivia    93  38  24  0  12  0  167  
Ecuador    101  0  32  0  164  0  297  
India     259  223  6  8  40  11  547  
Indonesia    25  0  0  165  17  7  214  
Mexico    35  178  12  0  11  0  236  
Nepal     63  42  19  44  48  0  216  
Nicaragua    140  14  14  0  23  0  191  
Peru     124  218  8  0  51  0  401  
Philippines    177  0  13  234  6  0  430  
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Table 4: Mean and standard deviations of output and prices of inputs employed in the translog cost function 
Country      GLP   AEA   FEA   PEA  
Bangladesh     4.36e+07  0.038   0.038   0.089 
      (1.32e+08)  (0.033)  (0.021)  (0.027) 
Bolivia     5.48e+07  0.056   0.043   0.074 
      (9.22e+07)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.034) 
Ecuador     1.99e+07  0.066   0.042   0.074 
      (4.68e+07)  (0.051)  (0.022)  (0.052) 
India      2.66e+07  0.050   0.077   0.060 
      (9.29e+07)  (0.060)  (0.031)  (0.051) 
Indonesia     6264720  0.054   0.082   0.076 
      (3.89e+07)  (0.044)  (0.038)  (0.063) 
Mexico     6.00e+07  0.151   0.064   0.208 
      (1.91e+08)  (0.076)  (0.038)  (0.119) 
Nepal      2736937  0.025   0.054   0.051 
      (3527610)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
Nicaragua     1.45e+07  0.090   0.063   0.097 
      (2.57e+07)  (0.053)  (0.033)  (0.051) 
Peru      6.14e+07  0.075   0.061   0.099 
      (1.33e+08)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.067) 
Philippines     6770964  0.095   0.043   0.120 
      (9618705)  (0.044)  (0.018)  (0.083) 
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. GLP: Gross loan portfolio, in US $; AEA: Administrative expenses to total assets ratio; FEA: 
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Table 5: Summary statistics of the Boone indicator for various countries (2003-10) 
Country  Observations   Mean   Median  St. Dev. Min.   Max.  
  
Bangladesh  302    -0.033   -0.031   0.015  -0.059             -0.011  
  
Bolivia  167   -0.008   0.001   0.021  -0.050   0.020  
  
Ecuador  297   -0.008   -0.001   0.013  -0.038   0.006  
  
India   547   -0.011   -0.009   0.031  -0.058   0.035  
  
Indonesia  214    0.003    0.005   0.012  -0.019   0.017  
  
Mexico  236    0.002   -0.0004  0.028  -0.035   0.109  
  
Nepal   216    -0.008   -0.007   0.005  -0.016             -0.0004   
Nicaragua  191   -0.025   -0.026   0.038  -0.091   0.018  
  
Peru   401    -0.006   -0.012   0.012  -0.018   0.024  
  
Philippines  430   -0.008   -0.009   0.005  -0.014   0.001  
  
Total   3001   -0.010   -0.010   0.023  -0.091   0.109  
  











Table 6: Developments of the Boone scores over time for various countries 
  Year/Countries   Bangladesh  India   Nepal    Indonesia  Philippines 
       Boone   Boone   Boone   Boone  
 Boone   
2003    -0.029      0.009   -0.013   -0.009    -0.013    
     (-0.24)   (0.04)   (-0.64)   (-0.55)   (-1.06) 
2004    -0.009       0.040   -0.009      0.007       0.001  
     (-0.18)   (0.30)   (-0.36)   (0.27)   (0.15) 
2005      -0.044       -0.003     -0.017      0.008   -0.008     
     (-1.56)   (-0.06)   (-0.53)   (0.48)   (-1.43) 
2006      -0.007      0.019      -0.001      0.006     -0.009 
     (-0.63)   (0.52)   (-0.06)   (0.71)   (-1.47) 
2007      -0.008       0.041      -0.005      0.018*       -0.009 
     (-0.64)   (1.18)   (-0.44)   (2.03)   (-1.84) 
2008      -0.034**   -0.008      -0.011      0.018       -0.002 
     (-3.06)   (-0.33)   (-0.95)   (2.46)   (-0.32) 
2009       -0.044**  -0.047     -0.007      -0.012     -0.011 
     (-2.96)   (-1.85)   (-0.71)   (-0.99)   (-1.72) 
2010      -0.039**    -0.052      -0.005    -0.015     -0.014 
     (-3.29)   (-1.76)   (-0.52)   (-0.96)   (-1.68) 
Note: Time dummies were included in regressions, but the coefficients are not shown. In the parentheses, t-values have been reported. 

















Table 6: Developments of the Boone scores over time for various countries (continued) 
  Year/Countries   Bolivia   Ecuador   Mexico   Nicaragua  Peru  
       Boone   Boone   Boone   Boone  
 Boone 
2003    -0.036    -0.011      -0.035      0.007   0.004 
     (-0.86)   (-0.91)   (-0.37)    (0.14)   (0.29) 
2004    -0.004       -0.045**      0.109       -0.001   0.024* 
     (-0.18)   (-3.43)   (0.42)   (-0.03)   (2.23) 
2005    -0.017      -0.014      0.039      -0.035   -0.011 
     (-1.63)   (-1.73)   (0.53)   (-0.70)   (-1.46) 
2006    -0.021     -0.029**      -0.022      -0.026   -0.013 
     (-1.64)   (-3.65)   (-0.66)   (-0.64)   (-1.94) 
2007    -0.018      -0.018     0.013       -0.003   -0.014 
     (-1.27)   (-1.90)   (0.36)   (-0.09)   (-1.82)  
2008    0.004       -0.005      -0.000     -0.019   -0.016 
     (0.38)   (0.92)   (-0.01)   (-0.64)   (-1.88) 
2009    0.011     0.003      -0.018     -0.073**  -0.004  
     (1.01)   (0.24)   (-0.62)   (-2.71)   (-0.65) 
2010    0.017*      -0.004     -0.011     -0.084***  -0.019*  
     (2.31)   (-0.32)   (-0.39)   (-3.31)   (-2.49) 
Note: Time dummies were included in regressions, but the coefficients are not shown. In the parentheses, t-values have been reported. Statistically 
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Appendix: Estimation for the Translog Cost Function (TCF) for the Boone indicator 
 
Table A1: Estimated Translog Cost Function by Countries 
      Bangladesh   India  Nepal  Indonesia Philippines 
     (BC95)   (BC95) (BC92) (BC95) (BC95)   
Dependent Variable: Total expenses  
Outputs 
Log (Loans)    1.051***  0.966*** 1.145*** 0.992*** 0.982*** 
                         (0.017)     (0.013)    (0.082)    (0.020)    (0.017)    
0.5*Log (Loans)2   0.009     -0.009  0.013  -0.008  -0.000 
                         (0.007)     (0.007)    (0.048)    (0.008)    (0.014) 
Input prices 
Log (PF)                     0.216*  0.327*** 0.075    0.250*** 0.320*** 
                         (0.100)     (0.016)    (0.161)    (0.016)    (0.045)    
Log (PPC)                     0.568***  0.395*** 0.577*** 0.402*** 0.360*** 
                         (0.059)     (0.073) (0.111)    (0.030)    (0.048)    
0.5*Log (PF)2        0.008     0.133*** 0.447** 0.121*** 0.133***  
                         (0.096)     (0.010)    (0.138)    (0.008) (0.026)    
0.5*Log (PPC)2        0.400***  0.172*** 0.470*** 0.365*** -0.003 
                         (0.058)     (0.046)    (0.105)    (0.051) (0.114)    
Cross-products between input prices 
Log (PF)*Log (PPC)     0.084     -0.113* -0.466*** -0.170*** -0.058 
                         (0.067)     (0.048)    (0.123)    (0.027)    (0.049)    
Cross-products between output and input prices 
Log (PF)*Log (Loans)   0.056*    0.031** -0.115  -0.030** 0.003 
                          (0.027)     (0.012)    (0.080)    (0.010) (0.017)        
Log (PPC)*Log (Loans) 0.025     -0.007  0.170*  -0.031  0.005 
                          (0.019)     (0.016)    (0.070)    (0.019) (0.023) 
Control variables 
Constant                  -0.507***  -0.523*** -0.501*** -0.401*** -0.365*** 
                          (0.072)     (0.025)    (0.085)    (0.035)    (0.048)    
λ       4.678***   62.605***   62.669***    3.559***     
       (0.097) (0.413)   (0.338) (0.157) 
σu       0.227* 5.391***   4.195***   0.414*  
       (0.111) (0.408)   (0.332) (0.163) 
σv       0.049 0.086***   0.067***  0.116***   
       (0.030) (0.010)   (0.012) (0.022) 
σ-constant      4.417*** 
       (0.451) 
γ-constant      8.090*** 
       (0.602) 
μ-constant      -341.506*** 
       (47.995) 
Log- 
Pseudo-likelihood     99.018 99.147  20.667  95.685  69.403 
Observations      127  359  106  142  319 
*BC95: Battese and Coelli (1995) model, BC92: Battese and Coelli (1992) model, PF: Price of funds, PPC: Price of 
physical capital. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00 
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Table A1: Estimated Translog Cost Function by Countries (contd.) 
     Bolivia Ecuador  Mexico Nicaragua Peru 
    (BC92) (BC95) (TFE)  (BC95) (BC95) 
Dependent Variable: Total expenses (normalised by personnel expenses, one of the input prices) 
Output 
Log (Loans)        1.068*** 0.996*** 0.808*** 1.033*** 1.007*** 
                        (0.042)    (0.011)    (0.050) (0.035) (0.010) 
0.5*Log (Loans)2         -0.012    0.009  0.005    -0.032  0.005 
                        (0.017)    (0.008) (0.021) (0.026) (0.006) 
Input prices 
Log (PF)   0.186    0.353*** 0.243*** 0.240*** 0.322*** 
                        (0.103)    (0.025)    (0.061)    (0.035) (0.034) 
Log (PPC)   0.265*** 0.286*** 0.386*** 0.372*** 0.394*** 
                        (0.047)    (0.026)    (0.060) (0.074) (0.051)    
0.5*Log (PF)2             -0.075    0.105*** 0.052  0.064*** 0.117** 
                        (0.124)    (0.014)    (0.030) (0.016) (0.040) 
0.5*Log (PPC)2  0.996*   0.518*** 0.120  0.137*** 0.228  
                        (0.392)    (0.098)    (0.084)    (0.031) (0.201) 
Cross-products between input prices 
Log (PF)*Log (PPC)   -0.083    -0.061*   -0.006  -0.043    -0.052  
                        (0.126)    (0.029) (0.046) (0.044) (0.083)    
Cross-products between output and input prices 
Log (PF)*Log (Loans)  0.062    0.011  -0.022    0.065** 0.017 
                        (0.050)    (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) 
Log (PPC)*Log (Loans) 0.083**  -0.007  -0.015  -0.020  -0.032 
                        (0.028)    (0.016) (0.045) (0.050) (0.027) 
Control variables 
Constant                -0.579*** -0.566*** --  -0.529*** -0.465*** 
                        (0.098)    (0.023)      (0.041) (0.036)    
λ      53.026*** 0.036  2.094***    9.549*** 
      (0 .706) (0.055) (0.060) (0.234) 
σu      3.655*** 0.006*** 0.156***   0.726**  
      (0.701) (0.002) (0.040) (0.230) 
σv      0.069*** 0.169*** 0.075**   0.076*** 
      (0.017) (0.057) (0.025) (0.013) 
σ-constant   2.362*** 
    (0.343) 
γ-constant   6.048*** 
    (0.365) 
μ-constant   -122.074*** 
    (12.232) 
Log- 
Pseudo-likelihood  48.225  137.698 65.177  60.915  160.308 
Observations              143  242   180    146  324 
*TFE: Greene (2005), True fixed-effects model, BC95: Battese and Coelli (1995) model, BC92: Battese and Coelli 
(1992) model, PF: Price of funds, PPC: Price of physical capital. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00 
 
